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Catastrophe (Cat) bonds are insurance securitization vehicles which are supposed to transfer 
catastrophe-related underwriting risk from issuers to capital markets. This paper addresses 
key, unanswered questions concerning Cat bonds and offers the following results.  First, our 
findings show firms that issue Cat bonds exhibit less risky underwriting portfolios with less 
exposure to catastrophe risks and overall less need to hedge catastrophe risk. These results 
show that the access to the market for insurance securitization is easiest for firms with less 
risky portfolios. Second, firms that issue Cat bonds are found to experience a reduction in 
their default risk relative to non-issuing firms and our results, therefore, demonstrate that Cat 
bonds provide effective catastrophe hedging for issuing firms. Third, firms with less 
catastrophe exposure, increase their catastrophe exposure following an issue. Therefore, our 
paper cautions that the ability to hedge catastrophe risk causes some firms to seek additional 
catastrophe risk. 
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Why firms choose to hedge, the effects of hedging on firm risk profiles and its 
implications for firm policy are important questions that a considerable literature in corporate 
finance has addressed over decades. In this paper, we add to this literature by analyzing the 
above questions for the case of catastrophe (Cat) bonds. Cat bonds are financial claims that 
protect the issuing firm from catastrophe losses by letting it forfeit on principal and/or coupon 
payments if a specified catastrophe loss event occurs (Cummins et al., 2002; Froot, 2001; Froot 
and O'Connell, 2008). Because Cat bonds relieve their issuers of some debt payments in the 
event of a natural catastrophe, their issue can be seen as a form of hedging against natural 
catastrophe risks. However, despite the fanfare with which Cat bonds were launched in the 
1990s, Cat bonds have trailed expections as the total volume of Cat bonds outstanding has 
remained relatively modest to date. This raises important questions over if and how Cat bonds 
work as a hedge against catastrophe risks and, more broadly, what determines whether firms 
engage in insurance securitization. 
The background to our paper is that firms with exposure to catastrophe risks have seen 
sharp increases in underwriting losses over recent decades. Crucially, the ability of insurers to 
finance these mounting catastrophe losses is uncertain mainly because the catastrophe 
underwriting capacity of the reinsurance markets, the conventional channel through which firms 
hedge their catastrophe exposures, is limited. Events such as the recent tsunami in Japan or 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 have, therefore, default risk implications for individual insurers and 
can, potentially, cause distress in the global insurance markets if they bring about the default of 
an insurer or a series of insurers. 
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Partly in response to concerns over the default risk implications of natural catastrophes 
for insurers, insurance securitization vehicles such as Cat bonds, mortality bonds and sidecars 
have emerged which are supposed to transfer catastrophe risks from insurers to capital markets. 
Among these insurance securitization vehicles, Cat bonds have been by far the most commonly 
used insurance securitization vehicle with nearly $31 billion of risk capital (i.e. the total of bond 
principal and coupon payments at risk) issued between 1997 and 2010 (AON Capital Markets, 
2010).* The total outstanding risk capital of Cat bonds issued between 1997 and 2010 
corresponds to about 8% of insured catastrophe losses during that period.† While this makes Cat 
bonds a considerable risk transfer mechanism for hedging catastrophe risk, the total coverage via 
Cat bonds has remained behind earlier expectations that saw Cat bonds as a substitute to 
catastrophe reinsurance. 
The low volumes of Cat bonds could partly be due to uncertainty over whether Cat bonds 
actually cause a significant transfer of catastrophe-related risk away from underwriters (Froot, 
2001; Finken and Laux, 2009). There have long been concerns that a risk transfer may not occur 
or be of only negligible magnitude. This is because, even though Cat bonds exhibit some 
hedging properties, they rarely meet the conditions that make them a perfect hedge against 
catastrophe underwriting losses. For instance, there are suggestions that issuers only securitize 
                                                       
* The volume of Cat bonds has grown rapidly following the particularly disastrous U.S. hurricane season of 2005 
(‘Catastrophe-Bond Supply Builds Up’, The Wall Street Journal, 27 September 2006). Increasingly, Cat bonds are 
also attracting the attention of retail investors (‘Catastrophe Bonds: Ports and Storms’, The Economist, 2 August 
2007) as well as governments in developing countries seeking affordable ways of financing reconstruction in the 
aftermath of natural catastrophes (‘Catastrophe insurance: When Calamity Strikes’, The Economist, 21 January 
2010). 
† Based on the authors’ calculations using Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1997 to 2010. See also, ‘Catastrophe 
bond offerings decline despite strong returns’, Financial Times, 29 August 2008. 
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remote catastrophe risks.‡ Consistent with this, few Cat bonds have caused losses for investors to 
date. This point is illustrated by Figure 1 which shows that the total returns for investors in Cat 
bonds (measured by the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond Total Return Index) have increased steadily 
despite highly volatile and generally increasing catastrophe losses realized by the insurance 
industry. Further, there is little association between Cat bond returns for investors and insured 
catastrophe losses. This is puzzling, because if Cat bonds were to offer a meaningful hedge 
against catastrophe-related underwriting risk, Cat bond returns and the catastrophe losses borne 
by the industry should be negatively related. 
 [Figure 1 near here] 
A further factor which casts doubt on the ability of Cat bonds to reduce the default risk of 
their issuers is that the triggers which permit the issuers of Cat bonds to forfeit often do not 
match the specific loss experience of the issuer.  Few Cat bonds use so-called indemnity triggers 
where payoffs are defined in terms of the issuer’s realized losses. Instead, triggers (non-
indemnity) are often defined in terms of industry-wide losses (e.g. via loss indices).  Non-
indemnity triggers give rise to basis risk which may leave insurers which have issued Cat bonds 
facing default in the event of high individual losses but low index losses (see Harrington and 
Niehaus, 1999; Cummins et al., 2004).§  
The above concerns prompt us to ask three important questions around Cat bonds and 
insurer default risk. First, which type of firms issue Cat bonds in a given year? It is important to 
                                                       
‡ Catastrophe bonds prove anything but a disaster, Financial Times, 2 June 2013. 
§ Both Harrington and Niehaus (1999) and Cummins et al. (2004) use simulation analyses to show that the basis risk 
linked to index-based triggers is manageable for U.S. homeowner insurers and large Hurricane insurers in Florida, 
respectively. However, it is important to bear in mind that these results are based on simulations. The risk that the 
payoffs from index-based Cat bonds do not cover the issuer’s catastrophe losses remains a concern for issuing firms. 
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understand the default risk implications of Cat bonds in the context of why firms issue Cat 
bonds. For instance, if insurance securitization was conducted by firms with very risky portfolios 
or follows large loss events for the industry or individual firms, any reduction in default risk 
post-issue may be unrelated to a Cat bond reducing default risk and may instead be due to default 
risk simply reverting to its long-term equilibrium after a loss event.   
Second, are Cat bonds effective in reducing insurer default risk and, if yes, do they 
indeed provide a hedge against catastrophe risk? It is important to bear in mind that Cat bonds 
could bring about a reduction in default risk not as a result of hedging catastrophe underwriting 
risks, but because of other risk-reducing attributes. For instance, unlike reinsurance, Cat bonds 
involve no counterparty risk. The pay-offs from Cat bonds for insurers are independent of the 
counterparty remaining solvent and Cat bond principals are fully collateralized (Lakdawalla and 
Zanjani, 2012).** Third, does hedging via insurance securitization affect underwriting behavior in 
the period following the issue of a Cat bond? If firms were to engage in a riskier underwriting 
strategy after they issued a Cat bond, this would raise the possibility of instability in global 
insurance and reinsurance markets if Cat bonds, though risk-reducing, cause some insurers to 
load up on more of the type of risks they have hedged via Cat bonds. In addressing these 
questions, this paper makes the following contributions.   
                                                       
** Further, Cat bonds shield issuers from volatile reinsurance premiums in the reinsurance markets where markets 
typically ‘harden’ and premiums increase rapidly following industry loss events (Froot and O'Connell, 2008; 
Cummins and Weiss, 2009). Cat bonds have a maturity of typically two to three years. This makes the cost of risk 
management via Cat bonds more predictable compared with reinsurance contracts which have a typical risk period 
of only one year. Consequently, the costs of coverage via Cat bonds are fixed for the issuer until the bond’s maturity 
and remain fixed irrespective of underwriting losses realized by either the issuer or the industry. Since large loss 
events typically cause reinsurance markets to ‘harden’, leading to higher prices, the multi-year maturity of Cat bonds 
may shield insurers from unexpected hikes in the pricing of catastrophe risk management (or a loss of coverage if 
reinsurance pricing becomes too unattractive). 
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We provide the first empirical examination into the determinants of firms issuing Cat 
bonds. Existing theory on this subject has come to conflicting predictions as regards, for 
instance, whether issuers have portfolios with a high potential for underwriting losses 
(Subramanian and Wang, 2013) or less risky portfolios (Gibson, Habib and Ziegler, 2011). Our 
results show that firms which issue Cat bonds have less catastrophe risk exposure and lower risk 
portfolios overall and, therefore, back explanations that access to the market for insurance 
securitization is easiest for firms with less risky portfolios. Put differently, our results show that 
Cat bonds issuers typically are not firms with high-risk or high-exposure portfolios in need to 
offload catastrophe risk to the financial markets. 
Second, we present the first empirical investigation into the realized risk implications of 
insurance securitization. Previous work on the risk implications of Cat bonds is based on 
simulations (Cummins et al., 2004; Harrington and Niehaus, 2003) and pointed out the various 
other risk-based effects of Cat bonds which are not necessarily linked to hedging catastrophe risk 
(Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2012; Cummins and Weiss, 2009; Froot and O'Connell, 2008). We 
show that Cat bonds reduce the default risk of issuing firms relative to firms that do not issue Cat 
bonds and, crucially, that this risk reduction is in part caused by hedging againsts catastrophe 
risks. Further, because our empirical approach simulteneously observes issuing and non-issuing 
firms as well as the reasons for why firms issue a Cat bond, we are able to deal with the potential 
endogeneity of a firm’s decision to issue a Cat bond in a standard two-step approach. While our 
main results are based on a probability of default indicator (based on the Merton model), our 
results are robust to using total market risk or credit default swap (CDS) yields as alternative 
measures of risk.  
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Finally, our results also identify some of the drivers and consequences of the risk 
reduction benefits of Cat bond issues. We show that the risk reduction benefits associated with 
insurance securitization are more pronounced during time periods when the supply of 
reinsurance as a substitute to catastrophe risk management is restricted. Further, almost all firms 
with little exposure to catastrophe risks before they issue a Cat bond will take on additional 
catastrophe risk in the two years following insurance securitization. Thus, many firms, after 
hedging, will load up on more of the type of risk they have hedged.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the Cat bond 
sample. Section 3 analyzes the determinants of when firms issue Cat bonds. This is followed by 
an analysis of the default risk implications of Cat bond issues in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
analyzes how Cat bond issues affect catastrophe underwriting behavior in the years following an 
issue before Section 6 concludes. 
2. Sample and Cat Bond Data 
Our sample includes all insurance and reinsurance firms listed on Datastream with 
accounting data available on Worldscope. This yields a sample of 274 firms from 1997 to 2010. 
We then identify firms which have issued Cat bonds using proprietary data from Hannover Re 
which cover all Cat bond issues before May 2010. Cat bonds are defined as bonds where 
coupons and/or principal payments are contingent on the occurrence of catastrophe-related 
property and casualty risks or catastrophe-related mortality risks.†† In all cases, the issuer is the 
ultimate beneficiary of the Cat bond coverage.‡‡  
                                                       
†† Catastrophe mortality risks result from catastrophe events which generate spikes in mortality rates (e.g. terrorist 
attacks or pandemics). While we include these so-called mortality (Cat) bonds in the sample, we exclude longevity 
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For an initial list of 143 Cat bond issues, we verify the Cat bond data from Hannover Re 
by matching them with publicly available information on insurance securitizations in AON 
Capital Markets (2010) and Guy Carpenter (2008). Where discrepancies between proprietary and 
public data (as regards the issue date, value and risks underlying an issue) are identified, we try 
to resolve these by conducting searches on various news sources available on LexisNexis and 
Factiva. Where the discrepancies remain unresolved, we omit the affected issue from our sample 
(this affects a total of seven issues). 
[Table 1 near here] 
We then omit issues for any one of the following reasons. First, when a firm issues more 
than one Cat bond in the same fiscal year, the transactions are consolidated into a single issue. 
This way, we lose 38 observations (mostly when repeat issues are made on the same day or 
within a matter of days)§§. Second, we drop so-called follow-up transactions from shelf offering 
programs. Shelf offering programs allow firms to issue further Cat bonds at any time. Follow-up 
transactions tend to be very small and have only a limited amount of information available. This 
affects 29 issues.  
Overall, we identify 69 Cat bond issues for our analysis. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the Cat bond issues by year and country. It becomes evident that the majority of Cat bond 
transactions took place after 2006 and that most Cat bonds were issued by firms listed in the 
U.S., Switzerland, and Germany. 
                                                       
bonds. This is because longevity bonds securitize longevity risk (due to increased life expectancy) and are not linked 
to catastrophe events (for more details, see Cowley and Cummins, 2005). 
‡‡ Transactions where the Cat bond coverage is sold by the issuer to a third party (i.e. Calabash Re Ltd. I-III by 
Swiss Re) are not included in the sample to avoid convoluted interpretations of our results. 
§§ For all cases where Cat bond transactions are consolidated, the trigger types of the individual transactions are 
identical. 
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3. The Determinants of Cat Bond Issues 
We start our investigation by analyzing which firms issue Cat bonds in a given year. It is 
important to understand when firms are likely to issue Cat bonds. Since firms self-select to issue 
a Cat bond, they are likely to differ from firms that do not issue Cat bonds in ways that may be 
relevant for the risk implications of insurance securitization. For instance, if insurers are more 
likely to opt for securitization if their insurance portfolios are risky, any reduction in default risk 
post-issue may be unrelated to a Cat bond reducing default risk and may instead due to portfolio 
risk reverting to its long-term mean after an issue. 
We are not aware of empirical work that has analyzed the determinants of firms issuing a 
Cat bond. Existing theory work on this subject has come to conflicting predictions as regards for 
instance whether issuers have portfolios with a high potential for underwriting losses 
(Subramanian and Wang, 2013) or less risky portfolios (Gibson, Habib and Ziegler, 2011). To 
understand which firms issue Cat bonds in a given year, we estimate the following probit model: 
 
Pr(CATBONDit=1)=(TCit-1, MCit-1, ei),    (1) 
 
where CATBONDit takes the value of one during the fiscal year that an insurance firm 
has issued a Cat bond (and zero otherwise), ICit-1 and MCit-1 are vectors of issuer and market 
controls (observed at the end of the fiscal year before the issue year t) and ei is a random error 
term.  
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3.1 Issuer Characteristics 
The vector of issuer controls in (1) includes the issuers’ profitability (ROA; defined as 
pre-tax profits scaled by total assets). More profitable insurers should find it easier to build up 
reserves as loss buffers in order to manage catastrophe-related underwriting risks (De Haan and 
Kakes, 2010). More profitable insurers should hence be less likely to issue a Cat bond. We 
control for issuer size (SIZE) which is measured by the logarithmic transformation of the 
issuers’ total assets. We expect firm size to enter the model with a positive coefficient because 
larger companies possess the adequate mass to produce transactions of sufficient scale to 
amortize the high structuring costs of Cat bonds (Cummins and Trainar, 2009) and because the 
basis risk involved in transactions is likely to decrease with the size of the issuing firm 
(Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
Next, we include various risk measures because the extant theory-based literature makes 
conflicting predictions as regards the effect of insurer risk on Cat bond issues. Citing supply side 
factors, Subramanian and Wang (2013) argue that high-risk insurers opt for securitization over 
reinsurance as a risk transfer mechanism.  Reinsurers posses superior resources over capital 
markets to monitor insurers and overcome adverse selection problems that result from insurers 
holding private information about their portfolios. This implies that catastrophe coverage is 
relatively costly via reinsurance for high-risk insurers. Risky insurers, that is, insurers with a 
higher prospect of underwriting losses, will therefore be the more likely issuers of catastrophe 
bonds.  
By contrast, Gibson, Habib and Ziegler (2011) cite demand side factors in the Cat bond 
market to argue that risky insurers will be less likely to issue Cat bonds. The authors argue that, 
when insurance losses are uncertain, it will be costly for insurers to issue Cat bonds to investors. 
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Given the prospect of adverse selection for investors if issuers are risky (investors do not have 
access to the private information that underlies insurer portfolios), investors in Cat bonds by 
risky issuers will insist on a high yield to compensate them for dealing with an informed 
counterparty. Hagendorff et al. (2013) present results which are consistent with this prediction 
We include the following risk measures in our models. The first three measures are 
derived from regressions that relate the stock returns of individual firms to the MSCI World 
Index and the global volume of insured catastrophe losses (from Swiss Re Sigma reports) over a 
three-year rolling window. First, we use the factor loadings on the MSCI World Index as a 
measure of market risk (MKTBETA). The variability (risk) of stock returns can be decomposed 
into (undiversifiable) market and (diversifiable) firm-specific risk components for each firm. 
Higher values of MKTBETA indicate that firms are more exposed to market risk.  
Second, we use the factor loadings on insured catastrophe losses from the same 
regressions to inform us how exposed a firm is to catastrophe underwriting losses. To ease the 
interpretation of the factor loadings, we replace positive factor loadings with zeros and take 
absolute values of the remaining factor loadings. That way, the measure captures firm value 
losses linked to industry catastrophe losses. We call the resulting measure CATEXPOSURE. 
Third, HIGHCATEXPOSURE indicates firms which are particularly exposed to catastrophe 
risk as indicated by firms being located in the top 40% of the sample distribution of 
CATEXPOSURE.*** Finally, we include two more variables to capture the risk of the issuer’s 
insurance portfolio. First, LOSSRATIO is the sum of claim expenses, loss expenses and long-
term insurance reserves scaled by earned premium income. Second, underwriting risk 
                                                       
*** The results we report are not sensitive to how we define HIGHCATEXPOSURE. The results we report remain 
qualitatively unchanged if we define firms as highly exposed to catastrophe risk if they are located in the top 40%, 
30%, 25%, or 10% of catastrophe exposure in the sample. 
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(UWRISK) is the standard deviation of LOSSRATIO over a four-year period before the issue 
announcement (also employed in de Haan and Kakes, 2010). Finally, we include a probability of 
default measure (PD, based on a Merton model as described in Section 4.2) to directly capture 
the default risk of insurance firms. 
We also control for the issuing firm’s LEVERAGE which is defined as total liabilities 
over total assets. Since securitization is a means to free up capital that can be used to absorb 
losses and lower the prospect of financial distress following a large loss event (Cummins and 
Trainar, 2009), highly leveraged firms should, therefore, be more likely to issue Cat bonds. 
We include measures of insurer DIVERSIFICATION (measured as the percentage of 
sales which do not stem from insurance premiums (1-[premiums written/net sales]), operating 
efficiency (EXPENSERATIO; underwriting expenses/premiums written) and Tobin’s Q 
(TOBQ, defined as a firm’s market-to-book ratio) as a proxy for a firm’s future growth 
opportunities. Both cost efficiency and Tobin’s Q can, in a wider sense, be understood as 
measures of managerial quality with better managed firms either more or less likely to issue Cat 
bonds. For instance, Gay and Nam (1998) argue that poor managers may be more likely to 
engage in hedging activities in order to mask their ability and the quality of their projects. 
Finally, we control for whether the firm is a REINSURANCE firm. Since we expect 
reinsurance to have greater exposure to catastrophe tail risks than insurance firms, we expect 
reinsurance firms to be more likely to be amongst the issuers of Cat bonds. 
3.2 Market Characteristics 
Moving on to the vector of market characteristics, we use the Guy Carpenter (2010) Rate 
On Line Index (REPRICES) as a measure of reinsurance prices. This yearly index is calculated 
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by dividing global catastrophe reinsurance premiums by global catastrophe reinsurance limits. 
REPRICES, therefore, measures average reinsurance prices per unit of catastrophe risk 
underwritten. 
Reinsurance markets tend to follow cycles which are characterized by periods when 
reinsurance prices are relatively low and coverage is readily available (soft markets), and periods 
when reinsurance prices are high and coverage supply is restricted (hard markets) (see Jaffee and 
Russell, 1997; Niehaus, 2002). During hard reinsurance markets, insurers will only be able to 
make limited use of catastrophe reinsurance and are more reliant on Cat bonds as a risk transfer 
mechanism. For some types of catastrophe events, no reinsurance capacity may be available 
during hard reinsurance markets, which means that Cat bonds will be the only vehicle for 
insurers to hedge their catastrophe-related underwriting risk. Owing to the lack of reinsurance 
capacity during hard reinsurance markets, we expect more Cat bond issues during hard 
reinsurance markets (when REPRICES is high). Consequently, we expect REPRICES to enter 
the model with a positive sign. 
We control for the influence of economic growth on the risk implications of insurance 
securitization by including the inflation-adjusted national GDP growth rates (GDP). If recessions 
decrease demand for insurance in general, we expect a negative sign between GDP and the 
probability of a Cat bond issue. We control for industry underwriting losses 
(GLOBALINSLOSSES) caused by natural catastrophes. Specifically, we use the yearly total of 
insured catastrophe losses (as published in Swiss Re Sigma Reports). We expect industry losses 
to be positively associated with Cat bond issues. Larger industry losses should lead to capacity 
constraints in reinsurance markets, thus making Cat bonds more attractive as a risk transfer 
mechanism. 
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Finally, we include a measure of potential catastrophe losses. It is likely that the prospect 
of future catastrophe losses, rather than actual industry losses, causes greater awareness of 
natural perils amongst insurers and increases the demand for risk transfer mechanisms such as 
Cat bonds. To capture potential catastrophe losses, we employ an index of storm activity in the 
Atlantic and Pacific by using the Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE) index as published by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Our variable POTENTIAL-
LOSSES equals one if the NOAA classified a storm season ‘above normal’ using ACE index 
values.†††  
[Table 2 near here] 
Table 2 presents summary statistics and shows that our sample contains a large and 
heterogeneous sample of insurance and reinsurance firms. The table shows that the average 
probability of default is 0.80%, 10% of sample firms are reinsurance firms and around one in 
three years during our sample period is characterised as above normal storm seasons. 
                                                       
††† The index measures the number of storm systems, how long they existed and how intense they became. ACE 
index values in excess of 120% of the median value over the preceding 30 years are classified as an ‘above normal 
season’ by the NOAA. While the index captures only wind-based catastrophe risks in the U.S., these are the 
dominant perils underlying Cat bonds by far (because they are the most capital-intensive perils in global insurance 
markets). To illustrate this, our sample contains only eight Cat bonds with no exposure to either U.S. risks and to 
wind risks. Therefore, if natural catastrophes lead to more demand for Cat bonds, irrespective of whether they cause 
insured losses for an insurer, this effect should be particularly so for the type of event and geography that underlies 
the vast majority of Cat bonds. The index is published at http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/E11.html. 
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3.3 Results: The Determinants of Cat Bond Issues 
The results of our prediction models of which firms issue a Cat bond in a particular year 
are presented in Table 3. The first four columns present the results using probit models while the 
last column uses an OLS model for added robustness.  
Perhaps our most surprising finding relates to the risk profile of Cat bond issuers. A 
series of variables indicate that insurers with less risky portfolios are more likely to issue a Cat 
bond. Thus, Cat bond issuers exhibit lower market risk, lower loss ratios, lower underwriting risk 
and, perhaps most importantly, lower exposure to natural catastrophes (measured both via the 
factor loading on catastrophe losses and a binary variable indicating a particularly high factor 
loading). While most measures of insurer portfolio risk enter below the 10% level individually, 
F-tests reveal that they are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level. These findings jointly 
point towards low-risk insurers issuing Cat bonds and are clearly in conflict with the view that 
insurance securitization is conducted by insurers with risky portfolios.  
[Table 3 near here] 
We argue the finding that low risk insurers issue Cat bonds is consistent with the notion 
of Cat bond investors demanding higher yields from riskier issuers which, therefore, make Cat 
bonds relatively unattractive for high-risk insurers relative to other catastrophe risk management 
channels (see Gibson et al., 2011). Since investors do not have access to the private information 
that underlie insurer portfolios and the true nature of the risks being securitized, it is likely that 
they will use publicly available information (such as the unpredictability of insurance losses or 
the exposure to catastrophe risk and other measures similar to the ones we employ above) as 
proxies for the true riskiness of an insurer’s portfolio. If Cat bond investors demand higher yields 
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in line with publicly observable risk measures, Cat bonds will be less attractive for this type of 
insurer compared to reinsurance. Because reinsurance firms have superior monitoring 
capabilities compared with investors, they will be able to price premiums more closely in line 
with the true insurance portfolio risk of an insurer, thus, making reinsurance, rather than 
securitisation, the preferred risk transfer choice for seemingly risky firms.  
There is also some evidence that firms are more likely to securitize following increases in 
industry insured losses caused by catastrophes as well as increases in our measure of potential 
wind-based losses. Therefore, uncertainty and potential underwriting losses are drivers of 
insurance securitization, not only realized underwriting losses. Further, reinsurance and larger 
firms are more likely to issue a Cat bond (all coefficients enter significantly at the 1% level). 
This is consistent with explanations that reinsurance firms have greater exposure to catastrophe 
tail risks and are thus more likely to employ Cat bonds as a way to hedge these risks. Further, 
larger firms have capacity to amortize the relatively high costs of a Cat bond issue. Finally, firms 
with more growth opportunities (higher TOBQ) are less likely to issue a Cat bond, which is 
consistent with the view that poor managers may be more likely to engage in hedging activities 
in order to mask their ability and the quality of their projects (Gay and Nam, 1998). 
In summary, the findings of the prediction models show that firms which issue a Cat 
bond differ from firms which do not engage in insurance securitization as regards their risk 
profile and other firm characteristics. Also, the timing of Cat bond issues depends on catastrophe 
loss events for the industry—both realised and potential losses. Both the firm and the market 
characteristics of Cat bond issuers we report in Table 3 have implications for the risk effects of 
insurance securitization as we explain below. 
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4 The Risk Implications of Issuing a Cat bond 
4.1 Identification Strategy 
In this section, we examine how effective Cat bonds are in transferring default risk from 
insurers to capital markets. The premise of our analysis is that, if Cat bonds provide an effective 
risk transfer, we expect the issuing firm’s default likelihood to decrease in response to the issue 
of a Cat bond. 
Our analysis of when firms issue Cat bonds has uncovered various industry- and firm-
specific factors as determinants of Cat bond issues. Our analysis will therefore have to deal with 
two resulting issues to produce unbiased estimates of the risk effects of Cat bond issues. First, 
there may be industry-wide factors that affect firms that issue a Cat bond and firms that do not 
issue a Cat bond equally. For instance, our analysis above uncovers that issues follow industry 
loss events. Any reduction in default risk after the issue may therefore be simply a return to 
normal market conditions that could otherwise be incorrectly attributed to the issue of a Cat 
bond. Second, the decision to issue a Cat bond is jointly determined with a number of factors 
which are internal to the firm. Indeed, we show above that insurance portfolio risk and firm size 
are determinants of insurance securitization. It is therefore likely that past values of firm 
variables and other variables which are unobservable, and therefore uncontrollable for us, are 
determinants of insurance securitization. Not accounting for this potential source of endogeneity 
will bias our estimates of the default risk effects of Cat bonds.  
To deal with both issues, we observe the default risk of firms that have issued Cat bonds 
and firms that have not issued Cat bonds simultaneously to account for omitted variables which 
may affect issuing and non-issuing firms. We then employ a two stages least squares (2SLS) 
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procedure to be able to also observe the reasons why firms issue in a particular year. The 2SLS 
procedure first estimates the fitted values of the prediction model reported in Column D of Table 
3 to yield CATBOND*, before estimating the following model of the default risk implications of 
issuing a Cat bond. 
PDit= α + βit CATBOND
*
it + γ’ICit-1 + δ’MCit-1+ γi+ γt +εit    (2) 
 
 
Where PDit is the probability of default for firm i at time t. PDit is based on a Merton 
model of default risk (described in Section 4.2). CATBOND*it are the fitted values of the 
prediction results of which firms issue Cat bonds in a particular year. Since PD relies on market 
data to produce a measure of expected risk, a one-year period is sufficient to fully capture 
changes in risk due to securitization as it is reasonable to assume that market prices will have 
adjusted to reflect changes in market prices in a short time period.‡‡‡,§§§ ICi is a vector of issuer 
characteristics at the end of the fiscal year before the issue announcement; and MCi is a vector of 
market specific characteristics and γi and γt control for unobserved random and time effects. The 
control variables are the same as in (1). We provide additional detail on how we treat the 
potential endogeneity of CATBOND below in Section 4.3. 
                                                       
‡‡‡ In some cases, announcements of Cat bond issues precede the issue date and, hypothetically speaking, this could 
lead to cases where issues are announced and completed in different fiscal years. We hand collect the dates on which 
Cat bond issues were first announced in the press by searching various news sources on LexisNexis and Factiva, as 
well as the issuing firms’ websites and ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm), an online practitioner portal for insurance 
securitization. We then confirm that for all the Cat bond issues in our sample, the announcement date falls within the 
same fiscal year as the issue date. Also, none of the issues in our sample are announced later than in October, 
leaving sufficient time for market prices to adjust during the same fiscal year to reflect the issue of a Cat bond.  
§§§ In untabulated tests, we redefine CATBOND to equal one for two years after the issue of a Cat bond. We find 
qualitatively identical results; that is, CATBOND enters significantly and negative (with the magnitude of the 
coefficient on CATBOND somewhat but not drastically lower). 
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4.2 Measuring the Probability of Default 
To estimate the effect of Cat bonds on the issuers’ default risk, we apply the Merton 
(1974) option pricing method. This default risk measure has recently been employed by Furfine 
and Rosen (2011) and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) to study the default risk implications of 
mergers and acquisitions. In later analyses, we demonstrate that our main findings hold when we 
use stock market volatility or the credit default swap (CDS) yields on senior bonds as alternative 
risk measures. The Merton default risk measure has several advantages over other risk measures. 
First, the measure can be calculated for all listed firms and not only for a subset of firms (as with 
the case of CDS spreads). Second, because it draws on market data, the Merton default risk 
measure picks up the expected risk benefits at the time of the issue even though these benefits 
will materialize at a future point in time. 
The daily default risk of issuing firms is estimated using the following probability of 
default risk (PD):  
,     (3) 
where VA,t  is the market value of assets on day t, Lt is the book value of total liabilities 
and, rft is the risk-free rate (proxied by the annualized yield on two-year government bonds in the 
issuer’s country), σA,t is the annualized asset volatility on day t, T is the time to maturity 
(conventionally set to one year), and N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution. 
The computation of PD requires estimates of VA,t  and σA,t, neither of which are directly 
observable. We simultaneously estimate the values of VA,t  and σA,t through an iterative process 
19 
based on the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing method. Specifically, we view the market 
value of a firm’s equity (VE,t) as a call option on the value of the firm’s assets by solving the 
following system of nonlinear equations: 
,        (4) 
,       (5) 
where, 
             (6) 
Equation (3) is the optimal hedge equation that relates the standard deviation of a firm’s 
equity value to the standard deviation of a firm’s total asset value (both on an annualized basis). 
To solve the system of nonlinear equations, we first employ as starting values for σA,t  the 
historical volatility of equity (computed daily on the basis of a 90-trading day rolling window) 
multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days in the year. We then use the daily 
values of σE,t!!and VE,t to compute the initial value of σA,t as . Finally, a 
Newton search algorithm identifies the daily values of VA,t  and σA,t which we then employ to 
compute the default likelihood for each issuer per day in (3). 
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4.3 Results: The Default Risk Implications of Issuing a Cat Bond 
Table 4 reports our main results. In all regressions, we use our panel of insurance and 
reinsurance firms and exploit variation in the issue of Cat bonds across firms and time to 
estimate the effect of issuing a Cat bond on firm default risk. In all models, CATBOND, the 
variable which indicates whether firms issued a cat dummy enters negatively and significantly 
(below the 1%-level). This presents clear evidence that the issue of a Cat bond leads to a 
reduction in default risk. 
The various columns in Table 4 differ so that we can demonstrate that our main result is 
robust to both the possibility of Cat bond issues being endogenously determined with insurer risk 
and robust to different techniques of treating this potential endogeneity. Column A uses a simple 
OLS model, while Column B uses the 2SLS regression approach which employs the fitted values 
of the prediction model in Column D of Table 3 for CATBOND. This approach requires us to 
identify an instrument that is related to the decision to issue a Cat bond in a particular year, but 
not to the probability of default of insurance firms.  
[Table 4 near here] 
As our results in Table 3 show, U.S. wind activity (captured by the ACE index and 
denoted by POTENTIAL-LOSSES) is a valid instrument as it is one of the statistically 
significant determinants of Cat bond issues (almost all Cat bonds are exposed to U.S. wind perils 
and more wind activity will cause greater awareness of such perils amongst insurers and increase 
demand for risk transfer mechanisms such as Cat bonds). However, to be a valid instrument, the 
ACE index should not affect the default risk of our international sample of insurers after 
controlling for firm and industry losses (as we do in Table 4). In unreported tests, we confirm 
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that there are indeed no statistically significant differences in firm default risk between periods 
with above normal wind seasons and other wind seasons. U.S. wind activity does not affect 
default risk because, (i) we measure wind levels (in t-1) and risk (in t) with a time lag of one year 
and (ii) a large proportion of the economic losses caused by U.S. wind activity are not insured 
and therefore do not cause underwriting losses for insurers.  
Arguably, a clear-cut external instrument for a firm’s decision to issue a Cat bond is 
difficult to identify. Therefore, Columns E and F of Table 4 use a different instrumental variable 
approach to treat the potential endogeneity of the Cat bond variable. We estimate our model 
using a dynamic panel based on a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator as 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and recently applied by Wintoki, Linck and Netter 
(2012) to deal with endogeneity issues in corporate finance research.****  The advantage of using 
a GMM estimator is that we can treat endogeneity without the need to identify external 
instruments. GMM uses information on a firm’s history (using lags and differences in insurer 
characteristics such as the decision to issue a Cat bond, risk exposures, etc.) as instruments for 
current insurer characteristics. A second advantage of the GMM approach is that it can account 
for the dynamic nature of risk. As we demonstrate below, previous risk is an important factor in 
explaining current values of risk and not accounting for this will bias any estimation of the risk 
effect linked to the issue of a Cat bond.††††  
                                                       
**** Following Blundell (2002), we use on the one-step GMM estimator. We do not use a system GMM estimator 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998), because untabulated tests reject the validity of the additional moment conditions (i.e. the 
level conditions). 
†††† Since we cannot rely on the Sargan statistic as a model specification test for the GMM estimation (due to the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, detected using a test proposed by Pagan and Hall (1983)), we justify the validity of 
the instruments using a test of second-order correlation. If we included enough lags to control for the dynamic 
aspects of our empirical relationship and if the assumptions of our specification are valid, by construction the 
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The results presented in Table 4 are clear. Cat bond issues cause a reduction in default 
risk. This result holds using a simple ordinary least squares OLS regression (which does not 
account for endogeneity of the Cat bond variable), or alternatively using the 2SLS or the 
dynamic GMM regressions (which both account for endogeneity of CATBOND).  Therefore, our 
main conclusion is that, regardless of whether or how we treat endogeneity concerns surrounding 
the issue of a Cat bond, our finding that Cat bonds reduce the default risk of issuing firms 
remains unchanged.  
It is interesting to point out that the coefficient on CATBOND in Column B of Table 4 
increases substantially compared with either the coefficients based on simple OLS or the GMM 
estimations in Columns C-E. This is because the IV approach in Column B replaces the binary 
(0-1) values of CATBOND with the predicted values of CATBOND. Since the predicted values 
are on average smaller than the binary values, the coefficient on the predicted values of 
CATBOND are larger in Column B.  
The results in Table 4 also show that high catastrophe exposure is one of the factors 
entering significantly, confirming that high levels of catastrophe risk exposure have default risk 
implications for the insurance and reinsurance industry. We also control for market risk which 
means the coefficients measure the effect on default risk after controlling for systematic risk 
components. Market risk enters with the expected positive sign.  
                                                       
residuals in first differences (AR(1)) should be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second 
differences (AR(2)). The m1 and m2 statistics confirm this. 
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4.4 Robustness: Different Risk Measures 
We conduct several tests to evaluate the robustness of our main result that Cat bonds 
lower the default risk of issuers. First, we assess whether or not our main conclusion holds if we 
employ two different measures of risk. Table 5 uses both total risk (measured as the standard 
deviation of monthly returns over one year) and credit default swap (CDS) spreads (on five-year 
senior bonds in local currency) from Bloomberg.  As standard in the literature, we select CDS 
contracts with a maturity of five years because these contracts are the most liquid.  Bloomberg 
constructs a composite quote referred to as Bloomberg Generic which is an arithmetic average of 
the CDS spreads offered by various market participants and which has the advantage of being 
insensitive to the evaluation of one market participant alone. 
[Table 5 near here] 
The table shows both the results of the models predicting which firms issue Cat bonds 
(Columns A and C) and the results of the 2SLS procedure which estimates the effect of Cat 
bonds on risk. Despite total risk being a different risk measure (it captures the investment risk for 
equity holders rather than default risk) and despite CDS spreads being available for only 58 out 
of our 274 sample firms, we can replicate our key results. Most importantly, CATBOND enters 
with a negatively and statistically significant coefficient (below 10%). 
Given the clear risk reduction benefits of Cat bonds, an important question is how such 
risk reductions are achieved. The next subsection analyzes if the risk benefits of Cat bonds are 
moderated by the risk profile of the issuing firm or the trigger type underlying the Cat bond. 
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4.5 When Do Cat Bonds Reduce Risk? 
In this subsection, we analyse some of the conditions under which Cat bonds reduce the 
default risk of issuing firms. For instance, it is important to know whether or not the risk 
reduction benefits linked to the issue of a Cat bond are indeed related to a firm’s catastrophe risk 
exposure or whether the risk reduction benefits vary by type of Cat bond (indemnity versus non 
indemnity). We do so by introducing a vector of interaction terms to the following equation: 
 
PDit= α + β1CATBONDit +β2 CATBONDit×INTER + γ’ICit-1 + γi δ’MCit-1+ γ i+ γt +εit  (7) 
 
Where β1 captures the average effect of Cat bond issues on the issuer’s probability of 
default (PD) and β2 any additional risk effect linked to certain Cat bond or market characteristics 
(INTER). We allow the effect of Cat bonds on the PD to depend on HIGHCATEXPOSURE, 
indemnity-based triggers (INDEM=1, zero otherwise), time periods of high (low) reinsurance 
prices (HIGHPRICES [LOWREPRICES]), and Cat bond ratings. 
We estimate (7) using GMM so that we do not have to identify additional external 
instruments for the (potentially endogenous) interaction terms. After all, there is the distinct 
possibility that, besides CATBOND, other explanatory variables are endogenous. GMM 
accounts simultaneously for the potential endogeneity of CATBOND as well as the Cat bond 
characteristics which we capture using internal instruments. For instance, the choice of which 
type of trigger to include in a bond is likely to be endogenous as an insurer has no reason to issue 
a bond with a trigger it expects to be at most weakly related to losses by the insurer. All variable 
definitions are as before.  
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The results in Table 6 show the following. The interaction term between CATBOND and 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE enters negatively (significant below 1%) showing that issuers which are 
highly exposed to catastrophe underwriting risk experience a larger reduction in default risk 
following the issue of a Cat bond. On average, highly exposed firms reduce their default risk by 
around 8% following the issue of a Cat bond (firms which are not highly exposed experience a 
default risk reduction of around half this magnitude).  
[Table 6 near here] 
The fact that the risk reduction benefits of Cat bonds increase in high catastrophe risk 
exposure is an important finding, because it demonstrates that one of the channels through which 
Cat bonds reduce risk is by hedging catastrophe-related underwriting risk. Ultimately, Cat bonds 
have various other features which are potentially risk-relevant (for instance, Cat bonds facilitate 
liquidity management by making the cost of catastrophe coverage more predictable over longer 
time periods) and it is not clear a priori whether the risk reduction benefits of Cat bonds are 
caused by catastrophe exposure or by other risk-relevant features of insurance securitization.  
Our interpretation that Cat bonds are an effective hedge against catastrophe-related 
default risk is further supported by the fact that the interactions involving 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE and INDEM also enter negatively and significantly. Cat bonds can be 
designed using either indemnity-based or non-indemnity based triggers. For indemnity-based 
triggers, Cat bond payoffs depend on the actual loss experience of the issuer’s own business. By 
contrast, the payoffs from Cat bonds linked to non-indemnity-based triggers are defined in terms 
of industry-wide losses (via loss indices) which may vary substantially from the underwriting 
losses realized by the issuer. As a result, non-indemnity-based triggers give rise to basis risk 
which rises the more the insured losses of the issuer and the index losses diverge. Since 
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indemnity-based triggers do not involve any basis risk, they serve as a perfect hedge against 
catastrophe-related underwriting losses (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999; Cummins et al., 2004). 
Our results in Columns F and G of Table 6 show that indemnity based issues reduce the 
default risk only if issuing firms are highly exposed to catastrophe underwriting risk. Columns G 
and H in Table 7 show that these types of Cat bonds reduce the probability of default of the 
issuing firm by around 20%. Otherwise, indemnity-based issuances reduce the default risk to the 
same magnitude as non-indemnity based issues. We interpret the presence of risk reduction 
benefits linked to Cat bonds without an indemnity-based trigger as an indication that the basis 
risk underlying these issues is not sufficiently large as to prevent the risk reducing effects of Cat 
bonds from materializing.  
[Table 7 near here] 
Prices in the reinsurance market also affect changes in the default likelihood in response 
to Cat bond issues. The interaction between Cat bond and HIGHPRICES enters with a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient (significant at the 5% level). This indicates that Cat bond 
issues during periods of high reinsurance prices lead to larger reductions in the default likelihood 
of issuing firms. We argue that hard reinsurance markets (when the supply of catastrophe 
coverage via reinsurance is restricted) make insurers more reliant on Cat bonds as a vehicle to 
hedge catastrophe risk and that this is likely to incentivize insurers to design Cat bonds such that 
they maximize the potential hedging benefits to them. 
Finally, Table 7 presents the results of additional interactions. The table is presented in 
abbreviated form with only the coefficients on CATBOND and on the interactions displayed. 
The results of these additional interactions show that the risk reduction benefits of Cat bonds are 
stronger for reinsurance firms (consistent with the view that reinsurers manage more catastrophe 
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risks than insurers). Further, the default risk implications of Cat bonds do not differ for firms 
based in the U.S. or firms based in Switzerland (both countries make sizable contributions to the 
sample) and between before the crisis and after the crisis.  
In summary, we find the following. Cat bond issues reduce the default risk of issuing 
firms and they do so by a larger degree if issuing firms are highly exposed to catastrophe 
underwriting risk and when highly-exposed firms issue an indemnity-based Cat bond. This is 
consistent with the view that Cat bonds offer an effective hedge against catastrophe-related 
underwriting risks and that the risk-reduction benefits of issuing Cat bonds are linked to the 
underwriting risks (and less so other risk relevant Cat bond attributes).  
In the next section, we analyze the final of our three main research questions, namely if 
firms that hedge catastrophe risks using Cat bonds alter their underwriting behavior in the time 
period following Cat bond issues. 
5 Do Cat Bond Issues Affect Catastrophe Underwriting Behavior? 
In this final section, we investigate how Cat bond issues affect catastrophe underwriting 
behavior in the years following an issue. We are interested to see how firm underwriting 
behaviour following Cat bond issues differs for firms which display high and low exposure to 
catastrophe risks. Our analysis above shows that high-exposure firms realize additional risk 
reductions from issuing Cat bonds relative to firms with less catastrophe exposure. However, the 
risk reduction effect of Cat bonds may be short-lived if firms engage in more aggressive 
catastrophe underwriting behaviour in the period following an issue. In other words, catastrophe 
hedging may make firms seek additional risk exposure to the type of risk they have previously 
hedged via Cat bonds.  
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Figure 2 shows changes in the catastrophe risk exposures of high-exposure issuers (Panel 
A) and low-exposure issuers (Panel B). As previously, high catastrophe exposure firms are firms 
with a factor loading on their stock return sensitivity to insured industry catastrophe losses which 
is above 60% of the sample distribution. Changes in catastrophe risk exposures are measured one 
year before the issue relative to one year after the issue of a Cat bond.‡‡‡‡ While Panel A shows 
that Cat bond issues were followed by a reduction in catastrophe exposure for most firms 
(consistent with explanations that Cat bonds are an effective catastrophe hedge), Panel B shows 
that most firms with low catastrophe exposure pre-issue increased their catastrophe exposure 
post-issue. The increase in catastrophe exposure amongst low-exposure firms is extremely 
widespread. Nearly all firms with low catastrophe exposure increase their catastrophe exposure 
in the years following an issue. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
A joint reading of these results and the results reported in the previous section shows that, 
while high-risk firms are intent on hedging catastrophe risk (they lower default risk and default 
risk exposures in the years following a Cat bond issue), low risk firms seek additional 
catastrophe risk exposure in the years following insurance securitization. This could be due to 
firms with low exposure writing catastrophe risks on a scale in the post-issue period they would 
have not considered before issuing a Cat bond. It may even be a strategy by some firms to hedge 
their existing catastrophe underwriting risks using Cat bonds before they seek to grow their 
catastrophe underwriting business. Either way, it appears that firms with little catastrophe 
exposure seek more risk of the type they have hedged using Cat bonds. 
                                                       
‡‡‡‡ We observe qualitatively identical patterns over a two-year period. 
29 
Whether or not the increased catastrophe risk exposure of some firms in the years 
following the issue of a Cat bond is a cause for concern is not obvious from our analysis. It is 
true that low-exposure firms do not increase their default risk when issuing a Cat bond (as shown 
in Table 6, Column B). However, the increased catastrophe risk exposure could prove 
problematic in the future if natural catastrophes occur more frequently in the next few years than 
forecasted at the time the catastrophe risks were underwritten. Models that determine the 
likelihood of natural perils such as hurricanes can be prone to error and are frequently revised. 
For instance, if hurricanes were to strike the U.S. more frequently than forecasted at the time the 
additional catastrophe risk was underwritten by our sample firms, the additional catastrophe 
exposure could give rise to large and currently unexpected underwriting losses. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Catastrophe-related underwriting activities are a source of default risk for insurance and 
reinsurance firms. Traditionally, reinsurance contracts have been the only instrument for insurers 
to transfer the underwriting risk linked to catastrophes. More recently, Cat bonds have emerged 
as an alternative risk transfer instrument. While the market for Cat bonds has undergone rapid 
growth, the overall volume of Cat bonds outstanding to date has remained lower than expected. 
The aims of our analysis are threefold. We examine the factors that determine the 
decision of a firm to issue a Cat bond; we study the risk implications of Cat bond issues; and we 
analyze the catastrophe underwriting behavior of insurers in the time period following an issue. 
Our main insights are as follows. First, Cat bonds are issued by firms with low risk underwriting 
portfolios and less exposure to catastrophe underwriting risk rather than by firms with highly 
risky portfolios seeking to hedge their catastrophe exposure. This suggests that seemingly risky 
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issuers have less access to the market for insurance securitization. Second, our paper provides the 
first empirical evidence that Cat bonds ‘work’ by showing that the issuers’ default risk decreases 
in response to the Cat bond issue and, crucially, that this reduction is at least in part due to firms 
reducing their exposure to catastrophe related underwriting risks.  
Finally, our analysis shows that when firms with relatively little underwriting exposure 
issue a Cat bond, they increase their catastrophe underwriting risk following the issue. This more 
aggressive catastrophe underwriting behavior in the years following a Cat bond issue is 
widespread amongst low-risk firms and it raises the spectre of instability in global insurance and 
reinsurance markets if Cat bonds, though risk-reducing, cause low-risk insurers to load up on 
more of the type of risks they have hedged via Cat bonds. 
Three main policy implications arise from our findings. First, since Cat bonds are clearly 
associated with a risk reduction for insurers, their use should be encouraged by regulators. This 
is particularly important given the increasing systemic relevance of a number of large insurance 
firms (Billio et al, 2012, Cummins and Weiss, 2010). Second, our analysis of the determinants of 
insurance securitization shows that insurers with low risk-risk portfolios are much more likely to 
issue a Cat bond. This raises the question whether high-risk and high-exposure insurers, in effect 
the type of firms that stand most to benefit from hedging via Cat bonds, are shut out of the 
market for insurance securitization. Thus, improved and more detailed disclosure of the types of 
catastrophe risks securitized and on the existing portfolio of insurance risk should create 
additional transparency to help overcome adverse selection concerns by investors. 
Third, the adoption of Cat bonds should be encouraged by regulators irrespective of the 
underlying trigger type. Presently, solvency regulations only permit issuers of Cat bonds with 
indemnity triggers to treat Cat bonds like reinsurance (and hold lower reserves against the 
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associated underwriting risks). This is because regulators are concerned that non-indemnity 
triggers involve basis risk which thwarts risk transfers which are sufficiently large to warrant 
lower capital holdings. Our results are at odds with the present regulatory treatment of Cat 
bonds, because our results show that non-indemnity based Cat bonds also reduce the default risk 
of the issuer. Therefore, insurance regulators should extend some form of favorable solvency 
treatment to non-indemnity based Cat bonds. 
While we report risk reduction benefits in response to the issue of Cat bonds, it is likely 
that the risk benefits of Cat bonds go beyond individual insurers. For instance, the global 
insurance and financial industry may have become less vulnerable to systemic distress as a result 
of more insurers engaging in insurance securitization. Future research should, therefore, examine 
the systemic stability effects of Cat bonds. Finally, while our default likelihood approach picks 
up expected changes in default risk around the time that a Cat bond is issued, it would equally be 
useful to understand the realized default risk implications of a large natural catastrophe. For 
instance, future research could examine the default risk effects of the recent Japanese earthquake 
on firms with underwriting exposure to this catastrophe and gauge if the risk effects were 
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Table 1. Catastrophe Bonds Included in the Sample 
By Year  By country  
of the issuing firm 
     
1997 1  France 10 
1998 3    
1999 2  Germany 15 
2000 4    
2001 4  Japan 4 
2002 3    
2003 1  Switzerland 15 
2004 1    
2005 5  UK 3 
2006 9    
2007 12  US 22 
2008 9    
2009 10    
2010 5 
 
   
TOTAL 69  TOTAL 69 
Based on proprietary data from Hannover Re and Aon Capital Markets. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Obs Mean St.Dev 25Pctile 75Pctile 
 
PD Probability of default (%)  1,859 0.802 6.414 0.000 0.012     
ROA Return on assets (%) 1,859 1.973 3.574 0.463 3.318 
SIZE Log of total assets (thousands of US) 1,859 15.697 2.131 14.099 17.141 
MKTBETA Market beta using a three-year rolling two factor model with the MSCI 
World Index and global insured losses (from Swiss Re) 
1,859 0.731 0.851 0.043 1.325 
CATEXPOSURE We use the factor loading on global insured losses based on a three-year 
rolling two-factor model with the MSCI World index and global insured 
losses (from Swiss Re). We replace positive factor loadings with zeros 
and take the absolute values the remaining factor loadings.  
1,859 0.421 1.377 0.041 0.505 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE Equals 1 if CATEXPOSURE is in the highest 40% of the sample 
distribution (zero otherwise). 
1,859 0.400 0.481   
LOSSRATIO (claims and loss expenses+ long-term insurance reserves)/  
premiums earned (%) 
1,859 97.76 134.23 36.70 205.41 
UWRISK Standard deviation of loss ratio over a four-year period 1,859 5.900 6.492 1.230 7.630 
LEVERAGE Total liabilities to total assets (%) 1,859 78.883 14.398 71.354 90.138 
DIVERSIFICATION 1-(premiums written/net sales) 1,859 0.202 0.354 0.058 0.310 
EXPENSERATIO Underwriting expenses/premiums written (%) 1,859 0.165 1.685 0.036 0.121 
TOBQ Market value of equity/book value of equity 1,859 1.688 3.393 0.950 1.770 
REINSURANCE Equals 1 if the firm is a reinsurer 1,859 0.104 0.305   
REPRICES Reinsurance Cycle. Guy Carpenter World Catastrophe Rate on Line 
Index. Source: Guy Carpinter (2010) 
1,859 226.789 42.686 205.000 255.000 
GDP Real GDP growth 1,859 4.485 2.353 3.690 6.174 
GLOBALINSLOSSES Global Insured Catastrophe Losses (in logs) from Swiss Re Sigma 
Reports  
1,859 9.297 1.194 8.713 10.040 
POTENTIAL-LOSSES Equals 1 if storm season in the Atlantic and Pacific is classified as ‘above 
normal’ by the NOAA  
1,859 0.313 0.464   
The sample consists of 258 firms over the period 1997 to 2010. Accounting data are cross-sectional averages for the sample period  




 Table 3. The Determinants of Issuing a Cat bond 
 




        
ROA -0.009 0.017 0.032 0.024 0.030 0.0004 
 [0.037] [0.038] [0.039] [0.041] [0.045] [0.001] 
SIZE 0.492*** 0.461*** 0.485*** 0.479*** 0.488*** 0.021* 
 [0.089] [0.09] [0.095] [0.097] [0.101] [0.011] 
MKTBETA -0.127** -0.130* -0.128* -0.105 -0.107 -0.004* 
 [0.063] [0.066] [0.068] [0.071] [0.071] [0.002] 
CATEXPOSURE -0.114 -0.136* -0.141*    
 [0.078] [0.077] [0.08]    
HIGHCATEXPOSURE    -0.337* -0.365* -0.017** 
    [0.200] [0.206] [0.008] 
LOSSRATIO -0.007** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* 0.000 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] 
UWRISK -0.009* -0.008 -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 0.000 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.000] 
PD     0.004  
     [0.008]  
LEVERAGE -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 
 [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.001] 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.151 -0.173 -0.189 -0.184 -0.171 -0.005 
 [0.151] [0.146] [0.144] [0.145] [0.150] [0.010] 
EXPENSERATIO -0.01 -0.017 -0.018 -0.021 -0.023 -0.001 
 [0.057] [0.051] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.002] 
TOBQ -0.111* -0.115* -0.125* -0.124* -0.136* -0.002 
 [0.062] [0.066] [0.067] [0.069] [0.069] [0.002] 
REINSURANCE 1.011*** 0.996*** 1.039*** 1.064*** 1.087***  
 [0.313] [0.309] [0.324] [0.334] [0.348]  
REPRICES  -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.000] 
GDP  -0.059* 0.017 0.033 0.03 0.001 
  [0.036] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.002] 
GLOBALINSLOSSES  0.027 0.202* 0.211** 0.198* 0.010** 
  [0.09] [0.105] [0.106] [0.108] [0.005] 
POTENTIAL-LOSSES   0.774*** 0.814*** 0.793*** 0.030*** 
   [0.257] [0.261] [0.268] [0.01] 
       
Constant -8.934*** -8.850*** -11.581*** -11.761*** -11.666*** -0.320** 
 [1.346] [1.604] [1.901] [1.924] [1.955] [0.139] 
       
Observations 1,974 1,974 1,974 1,974 1,859 1,974 
Number of firms 274 274 274 274 258 274 
R-squared      0.021 
Pseudo-Rsquared 0.164 0.172 0.196 0.197 0.198  
Time effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Unobserved effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports Probit regressions (columns A-E) and an OLS regression (column E) to explain which firms issue 
a Cat bond. The variables are as defined in Table 2. We report robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance 
levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 4. The Effect of Cat Bonds on Firm Probability of Default 
  A B C D E F 
 OLS IV OLS OLS GMM GMM 
       
       
PD(t-1)   0.123*** 0.127*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 
   [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] 
ROA -0.047 -0.003 -0.025 -0.027 -0.054 -0.057 
 [0.061] -0.11 [0.061] [0.061] [0.076] [0.076] 
SIZE 0.246 1.691 0.318 0.24 1.845** 1.710** 
 [0.428] [1.029] [0.425] [0.426] [0.778] [0.78] 
MKTBETA 0.387*** 0.171 0.335*** 0.346*** 0.466*** 0.446*** 
 [0.089] [0.19] [0.089] [0.09] [0.102] [0.102] 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE 0.902*** 0.016 0.807*** 0.854*** 1.111***  
 [0.308] [0.693] [0.307] [0.307] [0.352]  
LOWCATEXPOSURE      -0.932*** 
      [0.347] 
LOSSRATIO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
UWRISK -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
LEVERAGE 0.008 -0.063 0.003 0.006 -0.038 -0.036 
 [0.032] [0.066] [0.032] [0.032] [0.051] [0.051] 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.123 0.176 0.114 0.111 0.039 -0.006 
 [0.427] [0.76] [0.424] [0.425] [0.533] [0.534] 
EXPENSERATIO -0.026 -0.072 -0.023 -0.021 -0.067 -0.066 
 [0.064] [0.116] [0.064] [0.064] [0.069] [0.069] 
TOBQ 0.045 -0.102 0.041 0.049 -0.017 -0.007 
 [0.077] [0.154] [0.076] [0.076] [0.087] [0.088] 
REPRICES -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.004 
 [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] 
GDP -0.213*** -0.372** -0.160** -0.149** -0.256*** -0.264*** 
 [0.069] [0.145] [0.07] [0.07] [0.087] [0.087] 
GLOBALINSLOSSES -0.115 0.003 -0.135 -0.142 -0.076 -0.107 
 [0.155] [0.281] [0.154] [0.154] [0.201] [0.201] 
       
CATBOND -3.290*** -58.870** -3.103***  -4.738*** -4.791*** 
 [0.949] [26.725] [0.944]  [1.062] [1.063] 
       
Observations 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,471 1,471 
Number of firms 258 258 258 258 237 237 
R-squared 0.035  0.049 0.043   
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unobserved effects  No Yes No No Yes Yes 
This table reports OLS regressions (columns A,C,D); the second stage of 2SLS (column B) based on column C of 
Table 3; and first-stage of Arellano-Bond GMM estimators (columns E and F). The dependent variable is probability 
of default (PD). All variables are defined in Table 2.We report robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance 
levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5. Alternative Risk Measures 
 
  A B C D 
 Probit IV Probit IV 
 CATBOND TOTALRISK CATBOND CDS 
     
ROA 0.024 -0.012*** 0.281 -0.034 
 [0.041] [0.002] [0.19] [0.473] 
SIZE 0.479*** -0.043** 0.636*** -3.037 
 [0.097] [0.021] [0.188] [4.14] 
MKTBETA -0.105 0.042*** -0.107 0.039 
 [0.071] [0.004] [0.147] [0.533] 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE -0.337* 0.024 -0.921*** -2.878 
 [0.2] [0.015] [0.351] [1.823] 
LOSSRATIO -0.007* 0.000 -0.008 0.003 
 [0.004] [0.000] [0.007] [0.006] 
UWRISK -0.010* 0.000 -0.01 -0.001 
 [0.006] [0.000] [0.009] [0.009] 
LEVERAGE -0.008 0.002 0.043 -0.054 
 [0.013] [0.001] [0.047] [0.277] 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.184 -0.016 -1.917** 0.858 
 [0.145] [0.016] [0.901] [3.202] 
EXPENSERATIO -0.021 0.001 0.229 -0.654 
 [0.048] [0.003] [0.672] [2.035] 
TOBQ -0.124* -0.006* -0.445 -0.41 
 [0.069] [0.003] [0.326] [1.315] 
REINSURANCE 1.064***  1.184**  
 [0.334]  [0.494]  
REPRICES 0.001 0.000 0.044 0.26 
 [0.003] [0.000] [0.03] [0.16] 
GDP 0.033 -0.028*** -0.017 0.749** 
 [0.043] [0.003] [0.061] [0.348] 
GLOBALINSLOSSES 0.211** 0.005 1.277* 5.836 
 [0.106] [0.006] [0.727] [3.743] 
POTENTIAL-LOSSES 0.814***  0.924**  
 [0.261]  [0.403]  
     
CATBOND  -0.893*  -31.890* 
  [0.528]  [17.359] 
     
Constant 11.761*** 0.870*** 39.373*** -55.344 
 [1.924] [0.25] [14.758] [67.62] 
     
Observations 1,973 1,973 316 316 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unobserved effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 274 274 58 58 
 
This table reports 2SLS results. The first stage is based in Probit regressions (columns A and C) where the 
dependent variable is CATBOND. The second stage is reported in columns B and D, where column B uses CDS as 
the dependent variable and column D uses TOTAL RISK. We report robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Significance levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6. The Effect of Cat Bonds on the Probability of Default: Interaction terms 
  A B D E F G H 
        
PD(t-1) 0.127*** 0.084*** 0.131*** 0.148*** 0.076*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.029] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] 
ROA -0.059 -0.052 -0.061 -0.049 -0.044 -0.089 -0.096 
 [0.08] [0.076] [0.08] [0.079] [0.075] [0.081] [0.081] 
SIZE 2.003** 1.887** 1.951** 2.079** 1.702** 1.971** 2.070** 
 [0.818] [0.779] [0.818] [0.808] [0.78] [0.82] [0.822] 
MKTBETA 0.450*** 0.460*** 0.443*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.423*** 0.426*** 
 [0.103] [0.102] [0.104] [0.102] [0.102] [0.104] [0.104] 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE 0.434 1.051*** 0.440 0.376 1.116*** 0.392 0.380 
 [0.367] [0.353] [0.367] [0.363] [0.351] [0.369] [0.369] 
LOSSRATIO 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
UWRISK -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
LEVERAGE -0.024 -0.039 -0.019 -0.022 -0.027 -0.024 -0.035 
 [0.054] [0.051] [0.054] [0.053] [0.051] [0.054] [0.054] 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.491 -0.002 0.522 0.469 0.039 0.562 0.525 
 [0.592] [0.534] [0.592] [0.584] [0.532] [0.594] [0.594] 
EXPENSERATIO -0.083 -0.069 -0.079 -0.105 -0.063 -0.073 -0.085 
 [0.085] [0.069] [0.085] [0.084] [0.068] [0.086] [0.086] 
TOBQ -0.045 -0.018 -0.047 -0.042 -0.019 -0.045 -0.042 
 [0.091] [0.087] [0.091] [0.089] [0.087] [0.091] [0.091] 
REPRICES 0.017** 0.003 0.017** 0.018** 0.001 0.017** 0.017** 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
GDP -0.209** -0.264*** -0.209** -0.279*** -0.199** -0.212** -0.217** 
 [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.086] [0.089] [0.087] [0.087] 
GLOBALINSLOSSES 0.202 -0.064 0.196 0.244 -0.07 0.183 0.185 
 [0.223] [0.201] [0.224] [0.22] [0.201] [0.225] [0.225] 
        
CATBOND -4.140*** -4.752*** -3.81*** -3.602*** -10.95*** -3.044** -3.149** 
 [1.268] [1.559] [1.301] [1.318] [1.928] [1.327] [1.321] 
CAT.HIGHCATEXPOSURE -3.956**  -3.988* -5.077***  -1.744  
 [1.997]  [2.059] [1.961]  [2.181]  
CAT.LOWCATEXPOSURE  -2.387      
  [1.805]      
CAT.INDEM   1.42   2.073  
   [3.497]   [3.514]  
CAT.PD(t-1)    -0.499***    
    [0.1]    
CAT.LOWREPRICES     9.209***   
     [2.444]   
CAT.HIGHREPRICES     -5.936**   
     [2.422]   
CAT.HIGHCATEXPOSURE.INDEM     -14.53*** -18.87*** 
      [4.545] [4.57] 
        
Observations 1,326 1,471 1,326 1,326 1,471 1,326 1,326 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 232 237 232 232 237 232 232 
m1-statistic p(value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2-statistic p(value) 0.7711 0.772 0.7176 0.5228 0.9159 0.5875 0.5737 
Notes: This table reports first-stage Arellano-Bond GMM estimators where CATBOND and the interaction terms are treated as 
endogenous. The dependent variable, PD, and the explanatory variables are as defined in Table 2. We report robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7. Robustness Checks 
  A B C D E 
    pre-crisis post-crisis 
      
PD(t-1) 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.210*** -0.293*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.054] 
ROA -0.058 -0.05 -0.049 -0.023 0.034 
 [0.076] [0.076] [0.076] [0.078] [0.16] 
SIZE 1.884** 1.540** 1.843** 0.226 3.479 
 [0.777] [0.768] [0.778] [0.732] [3.163] 
MKTBETA 0.463*** 0.458*** 0.460*** 0.073 0.649** 
 [0.102] [0.102] [0.102] [0.094] [0.256] 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE 1.110*** 1.115*** 1.095*** -0.578* 2.471*** 
 [0.351] [0.351] [0.352] [0.331] [0.814] 
LOSSRATIO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] 
UWRISK -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] 
LEVERAGE -0.04 -0.027 -0.037 -0.03 0.019 
 [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.048] [0.145] 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.011 0.032 0.015 -0.05 0.809 
 [0.533] [0.533] [0.533] [0.477] [1.966] 
EXPENSERATIO -0.065 -0.064 -0.069 -0.019 -0.205 
 [0.069] [0.068] [0.069] [0.074] [0.228] 
TOBQ -0.018 -0.015 -0.02 -0.075 1.135 
 [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.069] [0.729] 
REPRICES 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.058 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.04] 
GDP -0.260*** -0.262*** -0.264*** -0.936*** 0.089 
 [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.338] [0.279] 
GLOBALINSLOSSES -0.048 -0.118 -0.086 0.338  
 [0.200] [0.200] [0.201] [0.243]  
      
CATBOND -2.525* -6.286*** -6.323*** -3.188** -6.326*** 
 [1.325] [1.483] [1.347] [1.253] [2.34] 
CAT.REINSURANCE -6.316***     
 -2.184     
CAT.USA  0.057    
  -2.532    
CAT.SWITZERLAND   0.486   
   -4.105   
CAT.HIGHCATEXPOSURE    -7.486*** -6.539* 
    -2.208 -3.36 
      
Observations 1,471 1,471 1,471 928 398 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 237 237 237 210 149 
m1-statistic p(value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2-statistic p(value) 0.761 0.8383 0.7784 0.557 0.000 
      
This table reports first-stage Arellano-Bond GMM estimators where CATBOND and the interaction terms are 
treated as endogenous. Column D presents results for the pre-crisis period (up to 2007) and column E for the post-
crisis period (after 2007). The dependent variable, PD, and the explanatory variables are as defined in Table 2. We 






Figure 1. Insured catastrophe losses and Cat bond Returns. 
Based on Swiss Re cat bond index which is a total return index using a global 
market value-weighted basket of natural catastrophe bonds tracked by Swiss Re. The 
total of global insured losses is based from Swiss Re Sigma reports. Sources: Swiss 























Figure 2. Changes in catastrophe risk exposure. The bars indicate changes in catastrophe exposure (based on firm 
stock return sensitivity to insured industry catastrophe) one year before the issue relative to one year after the issue 
of a Cat bond. Panel A shows changes in catastrophe exposure for firms with high catastrophe exposure (located in 
the top 40% of the distribution of catastrophe exposure) before the issue and Panel B shows firms the same changes 
for firms in remaining low catastrophe exposure group.  
